Examining smart-card security under the threat of power analysis attacks
Examining smart-card security under the threat of power analysis attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/tc.2002.1004593
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发表时间：
2002-05-01
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Sloan, RH
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Messerges, TS;Dabbish, EA;Sloan, RH
本文研究了监测功耗信号如何可能破坏智能卡的安全性，研究了简单功耗分析和差分功耗分析攻击。这些攻击背后的理论进行审查。然后，我们集中展示如何功率分析理论可以应用到攻击一个实际的智能卡。我们研究了功率信号的噪声特性，并开发了一种方法来建模的信号噪声比（SNR），我们展示了如何使用多比特攻击，可以显着提高这个SNR。针对智能卡实现的数据加密标准的实验结果表明，我们的多位攻击的有效性，这些攻击的潜在对策进行了讨论。
This paper examines how monitoring power consumption signals might breach smart-card security, Both simple power analysis and differential power analysis attacks are investigated. The theory behind these attacks is reviewed. Then, we concentrate on showing how power analysis theory can be applied to attack an actual smart card. We examine the noise characteristics of the power signals and develop an approach to model the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), We show how this SNR can be significantly improved using a multiple-bit attack. Experimental results against a smart-card implementation of the Data Encryption Standard demonstrate the effectiveness of our multiple-bit attack, Potential countermeasures to these attacks are also discussed.