Principal-Principal Conflicts and Corporate Philanthropy: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms

Principal-Principal Conflicts and Corporate Philanthropy: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms
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校长—校长冲突与企业慈善:来自中国私营企业的证据

DOI:
10.1007/s10551-015-2720-3
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
6.1
通讯作者:
Song Xianzhong
Song Xianzhong
中科院分区:
管理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Li Sihai;Wu Huiying;Song Xianzhong

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principal-principal视角认为,控股股东对企业慈善事业的影响过大,可能会将企业资金用于慈善事业,以支持其个人利益。对2004 - 2011年在深圳或上海证券交易所上市的中国民营企业样本的分析表明:(1)企业捐赠与最大股东持股比例之间存在显著的负相关关系,表明控股股东在指导企业慈善捐赠方面存在机会主义倾向;(2)公司捐赠与第一大股东及其代理人的政治关系显著正相关,表明公司捐赠与控股股东的个人利益之间存在兼容性;(3)政治关联企业的企业捐赠与最大股东持有的公司股份之间存在较强的负相关关系,表明政治关联有助于增加机会主义企业捐赠。总体而言,我们的研究通过检验和扩展“一主一主”框架,为“一主一主”现象提供了重要证据,并表明中国公司的大股东似乎以牺牲小股东的利益为代价,向慈善事业捐款,最终服务于他们的个人利益。
The principal–principal perspective suggests that controlling shareholders have excessive influence on corporate philanthropy and may direct corporate funds to charitable causes to support their personal interests. Analysis of a sample of Chinese private firms listed on the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange between 2004 and 2011 shows that (1) there is a significant and negative relationship between corporate giving and the share held by the largest shareholders, suggesting that controlling shareholders are opportunistic in directing corporate charitable contributions; (2) there is a significant and positive relationship between corporate giving and the political connections of the largest shareholders and their agents, suggesting compatibility between corporate contributions and the personal interests of the controlling shareholders; (3) there is a stronger negative relationship between corporate giving and the share of the company held by the largest shareholders in politically connected firms, suggesting that political connections contribute to increased opportunistic corporate giving. Overall, our study provides important evidence for the “one dominant controlling shareholder” phenomenon (yigududa) by testing and extending the principal–principal framework and showing that the largest shareholders of Chinese firms appear to donate to charitable causes that ultimately serve their personal interests at the expense of minority shareholders.