Selective Incentives and Intra-Group Heterogeneity in Collective Contests.
Selective Incentives and Intra-Group Heterogeneity in Collective Contests.
复制标题
集体竞赛中的选择性激励和组内异质性。
DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12290
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Kaoru Ueda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shmuel Nitzan;Kaoru Ueda
参加竞赛的团体必须面对其成员之间的集体行动问题，选择性激励措施是可能的解决手段。我们认为，竞争群体中的异质奖励评估通常会阻碍这种选择性激励的有效使用。为了证实这一说法，我们采用成本分摊作为激励各个团体成员的一种手段。我们证实，群体内的同质奖金估值会导致成本分摊规则，从而产生第一最佳的个人贡献。然而，只要成本分摊规则仅取决于成员的贡献，对于具有组内异质性的组来说，这样的第一最佳规则就不存在。我们的主要结果阐明了不平等的奖金估值如何影响成本分摊规则，特别是成本分摊的程度。如果边际努力成本的相对变化率正在下降，则它会因组内异质性而降低。如果比率增加，成本被完全分担，但它不能为群体带来最好的贡献。
A group taking part in a contest has to confront the collective action problem among its members, and devices of selective incentives are possible means of resolution. We argue that heterogeneous prize‐valuations in a competing group normally prevent effective use of such selective incentives. To substantiate this claim, we adopt cost‐sharing as a means of incentivizing the individual group members. We confirm that homogeneous prize valuations within a group result in a cost‐sharing rule inducing the first‐best individual contributions. As long as the cost‐sharing rule is dependent only on the members’ contributions, however, such a first‐best rule does not exist for a group with intragroup heterogeneity. Our main result clarifies how unequal prize valuations affect the cost‐sharing rule and, in particular, the degree of cost‐sharing. If the relative rate of change of the marginal effort costs is decreasing, it is reduced by intragroup heterogeneity. If the rate is increasing, the cost is fully shared, but it cannot induce the first‐best contributions for the group.