Presidential Intelligence

Presidential Intelligence
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总统情报

DOI:
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发表时间:
2016
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
S. Rascoff
S. Rascoff
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文献类型:
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作者:
S. Rascoff

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当学者——尤其是法律学者——谈论情报监督时,他们通常想到的是一套旨在阻止和发现非法行为和滥用行为的程序和制度。在本文中,我将重点讨论另一种意义上的情报监督,以及能够提供这种监督的不同机构行动者。我所描述和支持的这种监督的特点是,它关注促进有效的情报收集,同时寻求将各种成本降到最低,包括外交反弹、对美国公司的经济损害,以及威胁隐私权的侵入。已经开始提供这种更全面的监督的机构是总统,在他的工作人员(包括那些在国家安全委员会任职的人)的协助下,在这方面比现有的机构享有明显的优势。在包括盟国政府和科技公司在内的一系列知名利益集团的压力下,总统开始参与监控政策,并以一种系统的方式塑造情报收集的尺度和界限。这种发展——我称之为“总统情报”——与总统行政有着家族的相似之处,即转向集中的政治控制,这在一代人多的时间里主导了行政法的学术和实践。在这篇文章中,我对总统情报机构的兴起进行了描述性的描述,对其价值(作为现有监督机构的补充,而不是替代)进行了合格的规范辩护,并就如何设计机构以充分发挥其潜力提出了一套建议。
When scholars — especially legal academics — talk about intelligence oversight, they typically have in mind a set of processes and institutions designed to deter and detect illegality and abuse. In this Article, I focus on another sense of intelligence oversight and a different institutional actor capable of providing it. The kind of oversight that I describe and endorse is distinguished by its concern with promoting effective intelligence collection while seeking to minimize a wide range of costs, including diplomatic blowback, economic harm to American firms, and intrusiveness that threatens privacy rights. The institution that has begun to furnish this more holistic sort of oversight, and that enjoys conspicuous advantage over preexisting bodies in doing so, is the President, aided by his staff (including those serving on the National Security Council). Pressured by a constellation of prominent interest group actors, including allied governments and technology firms, the President has begun to weigh in on surveillance policy and to shape the metes and bounds of intelligence collection in a systematic fashion. This development — which I call presidential intelligence — bears a family resemblance to presidential administration, the turn to centralized, political control that has dominated the scholarship and practice of administrative law for over a generation. In this Article, I offer a descriptive account of the rise of presidential intelligence, a qualified normative defense of its value (as an addition to, rather than a replacement of, existing oversight bodies), and a set of prescriptions for how to design institutions in order to realize its full potential.