COMPARATIVE CAUSATION
COMPARATIVE CAUSATION
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比较因果关系
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发表时间：
2003
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通讯作者：
F. Parisi
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作者：
F. Parisi
正如Calabresi（1996年）所指出的，在最近的法律的和经济学文献中，没有人考虑过根据当事人对损失的相对因果贡献在无过错侵权人和无辜受害人之间分配事故损失的想法。这一责任分配标准，我们称之为“比较因果关系”，是本文的研究对象。我们提出了一个简短的比较因果关系原则的思想史，并提供了一个积极的经济模型。为了确定该规则的结构特征，我们首先考虑一个纯粹的比较因果关系的规则，其中责任分配的基础上的因果关系，无论当事人的过错。经济模型揭示了规则的一些有趣的特征，但也揭示了这种责任标准在诱发活动和护理水平方面的局限性。然后，本文扩展了经济模型，以考虑比较因果关系规则与过失规则的运作。在过失制度下适用比较因果关系规则会产生一系列已知的赔偿责任规则没有提供的激励措施。根据大多数责任规则，如果双方都没有过错，损失要么完全由受害者承担（例如，在基于过失的制度中）或完全转移到侵权行为人身上（例如，严格责任制度）。现有的法律的规则缺乏明确的方法来分配无过错受害人和无过错侵权人之间的损失。法律和经济学学者已经提供了令人信服的理由，说明什么时候让一些损失留在原地可能是有效的（即，受害人的损失不予赔偿），而效率要求将损失转嫁给侵权人。然而，正如卡拉布雷西（Calabresi，1996）所哀叹的那样，几乎没有人考虑过根据无过错侵权人和无辜受害人对损失的相对因果贡献来分配损失的想法。近年来，一些司法管辖区恢复了一个被遗忘的因果分配的范例1法律教授，乔治梅森法学院和主任，法律和经济学计划。2乔治华盛顿大学经济系助理教授。我们要感谢Erin Ruane Karsman提供的宝贵研究帮助，以及Dan Milkove的广泛评论。我们也感谢大卫A。Bragdon和Robert D. Cooter在这个项目的早期开发过程中进行了富有洞察力的对话。[3]损失分担通常发生在相对过失的情况下，只要双方当事人在其行为中未能达到最低限度的谨慎标准：见Schwartz，G.（1978）; Cooter and Ulen（1986）; and Rubinfeld（1987）. [4] 1996年5月10日至11日，在芝加哥举行的美国法律和经济学协会第六届年会上，圭多·卡拉布雷西作为晚宴发言人发表讲话，建议将比较因果关系作为一种
As Calabresi (1996) pointed out, no consideration has been given in recent legal and economic literature to the idea of distributing an accident loss among a faultless tortfeasor and an innocent victim on the basis of the relative causal contribution of the parties to the loss. This criterion of apportionment of liability, which we call “comparative causation,” is the object of this paper. We present a brief intellectual history of the principle of comparative causation and provide a positive economic model. In order to identify structural features of the rule, we first consider a rule of pure comparative causation where liability is allocated on the basis of causation, regardless of parties’ fault. The economic model brings to light some interesting features of the rule, but also unveils the limits of such a criterion of liability with respect to induced activity and care levels. The paper then extends the economic model to consider the workings of the comparative causation rule in conjunction with negligence rules. Applying the comparative causation rule under a negligence regime induces a combination of incentives that no known liability rule provides. Under most liability rules, if neither party is at fault the loss is either entirely borne by the victim (e.g., in a negligence-based system) or is shifted entirely on the tortfeasor (e.g., in a strict liability system). Existing legal rules lack explicit ways to apportion the loss between a faultless victim and a faultless tortfeasor. Law and economics scholars have provided convincing rationales as to when it may be efficient to let some losses rest where they fall (i.e., leaving the victim’s loss uncompensated), and when instead efficiency dictates shifting the loss on the tortfeasor. Yet, as Calabresi (1996) lamented, little consideration has been given to the idea of distributing the loss between a faultless tortfeasor and an innocent victim according to their relative causal contribution to the loss. In recent years, some jurisdictions revived a forgotten paradigm of causal apportionment of 1 Professor of Law, George Mason School of Law & Director, Law and Economics Program. 2 Assistant Professor, George Washington University, Department of Economics. We would like to thank Erin Ruane Karsman for her valuable research assistance and Dan Milkove for his extensive comments. We also thank David A. Bragdon and Robert D. Cooter for insightful conversations during the early development of this project. 3 Loss sharing generally takes place under comparative negligence whenever both parties have failed to meet their minimum standards of care in their conduct: see Schwartz, G. (1978); Cooter and Ulen (1986); and Rubinfeld (1987). 4 In his address as a Dinner Speaker at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Law & Economics Association, held in Chicago, May 10-11, 1996, Guido Calabresi suggested comparative causation as a