Power structure and profitability in a three-echelon supply chain facing stochastic demand
Power structure and profitability in a three-echelon supply chain facing stochastic demand
复制标题
随机需求下三级供应链的权力结构与盈利能力
DOI：
10.1016/j.cie.2021.107246
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
7.9
通讯作者：
Kenji Matsui
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hashiguchi N;Sengoku S;Kubota Y;Kitahara S;Lim Y;Kenji Matsui
在本文中，我们研究了如何在供应链成员要求各自的利润，这通常被称为权力结构的顺序，影响他们的盈利能力，在一个三级供应链面对随机需求。我们考虑了一个典型的三级供应链，包括一个上游企业，一个中游企业和一个下游企业。以前的供应链模型研究权力结构已经表明了传统的结果，即在确定性环境中，较早设定价格或利润率的供应链成员会产生更高的利润;也就是说，在三级链中，企业获得更高的利润的顺序是先动者、后动者和第三动者。在这里，先行者、后动者和第三动者分别是指将其利润率设置在第一、第二和第三位的供应链成员。我们的随机模型表明了一个截然不同的结果，即在需求不确定性下的预期利润按以下顺序较高：（i）在广泛的情况下，第三移动者，第一移动者和第二移动者谁要求利润或（ii）在较窄的情况下，第三移动者，第二移动者和第一移动者。也就是说，导致第一种情况的外生参数的范围比导致第二种情况的外生参数的范围宽。结果表明，在随机环境下，先动优势完全丧失，而最后动优势总是出现。目前，供应链中的权力往往从上游企业转移到下游企业。然而，我们的研究结果警告一个供应链成员在随机环境中，如果假设领导设置其价格或利润只是因为它有权力这样做，成员最终可以伤害自己，减少自己的利润。
In this paper, we investigate how the order in which supply chain members demand their respective margins, which is often called power structure, influences their profitability in a three-echelon supply chain facing stochastic demand. We consider a typical three-echelon supply chain consisting of an upstream firm, a midstream firm, and a downstream firm. Previous supply chain models examining power structure have shown the conventional result that a supply chain member that sets a price or margin earlier generates a higher profit in a deterministic environment; that is, firms achieve higher profits in the order of the first-mover, the second-mover, and the third-mover who set margins in a three-echelon chain. Here, the first-mover, second-mover, and third-mover mean the supply chain member who sets its margin first, second, and third, respectively. Our stochastic model suggests the starkly contrasting result that the expected profit under demand uncertainty is higher in the order: (i) in a wide range of circumstances, the third-mover, the first-mover, and the second-mover who demand margins or (ii) in a narrower range of circumstances, the third-mover, the second-mover, and the first-mover. That is, the range of exogenous parameters leading to the first case is broader than that leading to the second case. The result indicates that the first-mover advantage is completely lost and, instead, the last-mover advantage always arises in a stochastic environment. Currently, power in supply chains tends to shift from upstream firms to downstream firms. However, our results warn a supply chain member in a stochastic environment that if assuming leadership to set its price or margin just because it has the power to do so, the member can ultimately harm itself and reduce its own profit.