Port privatization under Cournot vs. Bertrand competition: a third-market approach
Port privatization under Cournot vs. Bertrand competition: a third-market approach
复制标题
DOI：
10.1080/03088839.2017.1336262
复制
发表时间：
2017-06
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Dongjoon Lee;Seonyoung Lim;Kangsik Choi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dongjoon Lee;Seonyoung Lim;Kangsik Choi
摘要通过将港口竞争纳入由两个出口企业和一个进口国组成的第三市场模型，我们证明了在贝特朗竞争或古诺竞争下，港口结构（即私有化或公有化）的内生选择。与以往的港口竞争研究不同，本文从所有贸易国（即进口国和出口国）的角度来分析港口战略。研究发现，无论运输成本如何，出口企业的港口所有权策略会随着出口企业的竞争模式而改变。在Bertrand竞争条件下，港口所有权结构的选择取决于港口的不完全替代程度。然而，在古诺竞争下，所有贸易国选择相同的所有权结构的每个港口。通过比较各竞争模式下的均衡，我们发现，在产品具有充分替代性的条件下，古诺竞争下的出口国福利高于伯特兰竞争下的出口国福利。相反，当竞争压力足够大时，进口国更倾向于伯特兰竞争而不是古诺竞争。
ABSTRACT By incorporating port competition into a third-market model consisting of two exporting firms and one importing country, we demonstrate the endogenous choice of port structures (i.e. privatization or public ownership) under either Bertrand or Cournot competition. In contrast to previous studies on port competition, we analyze the port strategy in view of all trading countries (i.e. importing country and exporting countries). We find that regardless of transport cost, the port ownership strategy alters according to exporting firm’s competition mode. Under Bertrand competition, the choice of port ownership structure depends on the degree of imperfect substitutability. However, under Cournot competition, all trading countries choose same ownership structures of each port. By comparing equilibrium of each competition mode, we show that welfare of exporting country under Cournot competition is higher than under Bertrand competition if goods are sufficiently substitutes. In contrast, importing country prefers Bertrand competition to Cournot competition when the competitive pressure is sufficiently high.