Biased confabulation in risky choice.
Biased confabulation in risky choice.
复制标题
冒险选择中的偏见性虚构。
DOI：
10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105245
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Mason A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mason A
当人们根据过去的经验做出冒险的决定时，他们必须依靠记忆。支持这些决定的记忆表征的性质还没有得到很好的理解。一个关键的问题是，人们在多大程度上回忆起过去的具体事件，或者他们是否从过去的经验中学到了更抽象的规则。为了解决这个问题，我们研究了在风险决策中使用的记忆的精确性。在三个预先注册的实验中，我们向人们提供了风险选项，其中结果来自连续范围（例如，100-190或500-590），然后评估他们对所经历结果的记忆。在两个优先任务中，人们更倾向于冒险寻求高价值而不是低价值的选项，他们的选择似乎是在更极端的范围内高估了结果。此外，在两个优先任务和一个平行的评估任务中，人们在回忆遇到的确切结果时非常差，而是虚构与他们看到的结果一致的结果，并偏向于遇到的更极端的范围。这种共同的模式表明，在优先任务中观察到的决策偏差反映了一个基本的认知过程，以超重的极端结果的记忆。这些结果突出了重要性的边缘分布在提供编码的背景记忆回忆。他们还认为，情景记忆通过要旨记忆而不是通过直接回忆具体实例来影响决策。
When people make risky decisions based on past experience, they must rely on memory. The nature of the memory representations that support these decisions is not yet well understood. A key question concerns the extent to which people recall specific past episodes or whether they have learned a more abstract rule from their past experience. To address this question, we examined the precision of the memories used in risky decisions-from-experience. In three pre-registered experiments, we presented people with risky options, where the outcomes were drawn from continuous ranges (e.g., 100–190 or 500–590), and then assessed their memories for the outcomes experienced. In two preferential tasks, people were more risk seeking for high-value than low-value options, choosing as though they overweighted the outcomes from more extreme ranges. Moreover, in two preferential tasks and a parallel evaluation task, people were very poor at recalling the exact outcomes encountered, but rather confabulated outcomes that were consistent with the outcomes they had seen and were biased towards the more extreme ranges encountered. This common pattern suggests that the observed decision bias in the preferential task reflects a basic cognitive process to overweight extreme outcomes in memory. These results highlight the importance of the edges of the distribution in providing the encoding context for memory recall. They also suggest that episodic memory influences decision-making through gist memory and not through direct recall of specific instances.