Producing compliant business behaviour: disclosure of food inspection results in Denmark and Germany

Producing compliant business behaviour: disclosure of food inspection results in Denmark and Germany
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生产合规商业行为:丹麦和德国披露食品检验结果

DOI:
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发表时间:
2012
期刊:
Journal für Verbraucherschütz und Lebensmittelsicherheit
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
N. Hirschauer
N. Hirschauer
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
M. Bavorova;N. Hirschauer

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公开披露食品检验结果(“点名羞辱”)越来越多地用于促进遵守食品法规。点名羞辱措施通过提高透明度、加强消费者主权并使他们能够做出明智的选择来解决市场失灵问题。消费者更喜欢从合规的食品企业购买。如果合规信息成功传达给消费者,不合规的企业将面临竞争劣势。他们不仅会受到国家的制裁,还会失去市场份额。此外,来自“相关其他人”(例如朋友和老顾客)的社会制裁可能与市场制裁有关。经济和社会制裁都进一步激发了遵守的动力。因此,点名羞辱措施有望有效提高食品法规的合规性,同时降低纳税人的成本。既有效又具有成本效益的监管策略被认为是“明智的”。明智监管方法的先决条件是它们在国家的法律和宪法环境中具有法律可行性。在此背景下,针对当前德国引入公开披露制度的政治讨论,我们对成熟的丹麦笑脸计划和德国的三个试点项目进行了比较分析。为了确定改进的潜力,我们解决了这些系统的制度设计及其有效性和成本。
Public disclosure of food inspection results (“name-and-shame”) is increasingly used to promote compliance with food regulations. Name-and-shame measures tackle the problem of market failure by increasing transparency, strengthening the sovereignty of consumers and enabling them to make informed choices. Consumers prefer to buy from compliant food businesses. If information on compliance is successfully conveyed to consumers, non-compliant businesses will face a competitive disadvantage. They will be sanctioned not only by the state but also by a loss of market share. Additionally, social sanctioning from “relevant others”, such as friends and regular customers, may be linked with market sanctions. Both economic and social sanctions further the motivation to comply. Name-and-shame measures are thereby expected to effectively increase compliance with food regulations while keeping costs low for tax payers. Regulatory strategies which are both effective and cost-efficient are said to be “smart”. A prerequisite of smart regulatory approaches is that they are legally viable within a nation’s legal and constitutional environment. Against this background, and with a view to the current political discussions regarding the introduction of a public disclosure system in Germany, we carry out a comparative analysis of the well-established Danish smiley scheme and three pilot projects in Germany. Aiming at identifying the potential for improvement, we address the institutional design of these systems as well as their effectiveness and costs.