Contests for Status
Contests for Status
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DOI：
10.1086/518010
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发表时间：
2005-07
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
B. Moldovanu;A. Sela;Xianwen Shi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Moldovanu;A. Sela;Xianwen Shi
本文研究了在竞争主体关心其相对位置的假设下，组织的最优设计问题。主体决定状态类别的数量和大小，以便最大化输出。我们首先考虑没有有形奖励的纯粹地位案例。我们的结果将状态类别的最优划分与参赛者之间能力分布的属性联系起来。顶级状态类别总是包含一个惟一的元素。对于失败率（IFR）不断增加的分布，状态类的扩散是最优的，而如果能力分布足够凹，则最优划分只涉及两个类别。此外，对于IFR分布，具有两个状态类别的粗分区至少达到具有多个类别的最优分区所获得的输出的一半。最后，如果地位只来源于金钱奖励，我们证明了地位类的最优划分只包含两个类别。
We study the optimal design of organizations under the assumption that agents in a contest care about their relative position. A principal determines the number and size of status categories in order to maximize output. We first consider the pure status case without tangible prizes. Our results connect the optimal partition in status categories to properties of the distribution of ability among contestants. The top status category always contains a unique element. For distributions that have an increasing failure rate (IFR), a proliferation of status classes is optimal, whereas the optimal partition involves only two categories if the distribution of abilities is sufficiently concave. Moreover, for IFR distributions, a coarse partition with two status categories achieves at least half of the output obtained in the optimal partition with many categories. Finally, if status is derived solely from monetary rewards, we show that the optimal partition in status classes contains only two categories.