Is There a Hold-Up Problem?
Is There a Hold-Up Problem?
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是否存在滞留问题？
DOI：
10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00373.x
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Johannesson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tore Ellingsen;M. Johannesson
关于套牢问题的大多数文献都是从这样一个假设开始的，即事后讨价还价的结果对先前的投资成本不敏感。我们认为，这种做法是不令人满意的。如果谈判过程是相对对称的，它通常会允许多个完美均衡，其中一些会给投资者足够高的回报，以维持有效的投资。即使谈判程序是不对称的，对投资者不利，如果代理人受到道德关切的驱使，或者如果沟通产生了承诺，也可能有投资。实验室实验表明，沟通是必要的和充分的代理人协调有效的结果时，讨价还价的游戏是对称的。当讨价还价游戏被操纵而不利于投资者时，道德行为会减轻套牢问题，但不会消除。沟通是相当可信的，我们发现承诺比威胁更可信。
Most literature on the hold-up problem starts from the assumption that ex post bargaining outcomes are insensitive to prior investment costs. We argue that this approach is unsatisfactory. If the bargaining procedure is relatively symmetric, it typically admits multiple perfect equilibria, some of which give the investor a high enough payoff to sustain efficient investment. Even if the bargaining procedure is asymmetric and rigged against the investor, there may be investment if agents are driven by moral concerns or if communication creates commitment. Laboratory experiments indicate that communication is necessary and sufficient for agents to coordinate on efficient outcomes when the bargaining game is symmetric. When the bargaining game is rigged against the investor, the hold-up problem is mitigated, but not eliminated, by moral behavior. Communication is quite credible, and we find that promises are more believable that threats.