Patent Protection and Global Schumpeterian Growth
Patent Protection and Global Schumpeterian Growth
复制标题
专利保护和全球熊彼特式增长
DOI：
10.4324/9780203932926.pt2
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Constantinos Syropoulos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Dinopoulos;Ali Gungoraydinoglu;Constantinos Syropoulos
本文建立了一个规模不变的全球熊彼特（R&D为基础）增长，南北贸易和国际专利保护的动态模型。知识产权保护采取的形式是授予发现新的更高质量产品的北方公司有限长度和完全可执行的全球专利。该模型产生了产品周期贸易、内生的长期熊彼特增长和内生的北方和南方工人之间的工资差距。全球专利长度的增加会加剧南北之间的工资收入不平等，增加产品模仿率，并对长期熊彼特增长产生模糊的影响。如果受专利保护的行业的初始指标足够高，那么全球专利长度的增加会降低全球创新和增长的长期速度。以南方国家规模扩大为形式的全球化增加了模仿的速度，并不影响创新和增长的长期速度，并改变了北方和南方工人之间的工资收入分配。
The paper develops a dynamic model of scale-invariant global Schumpeterian (R&D- based) growth, North-South trade, and international patent protection. Intellectual property protection takes the form of finite-length and perfectly enforceable global patents awarded to Northern firms that discover new higher-quality products. The model generates product-cycle trade, endogenous long- run Schumpeterian growth, and an endogenous wage gap between Northern and Southern workers. An increase in the global patent length worsens the wage-income inequality between North and South, increases the rate of product imitation and has an ambiguous effect on long-run Schumpeterian growth. If the initial measure of industries protected by patents is sufficiently high, then a rise in the global patent length reduces the long-run rate of global innovation and growth. Globalization that takes the form of an expansion in the size of the South increases the rate of imitation, does not affect the long-run rate of innovation and growth, and worsens the wage-income distribution between Northern and Southern workers.