A cognitive hierarchy model of games
A cognitive hierarchy model of games
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DOI：
10.1162/0033553041502225
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发表时间：
2004-08-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Chong, JK
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Camerer, CF;Ho, TH;Chong, JK
如果游戏中的玩家是理性的，并准确地预测其他玩家的策略，那么他们就是“均衡”的。然而，在许多实验中，参与者并不处于平衡状态。另一种选择是“认知等级”(CH)理论，每个参与者都认为自己的策略是最复杂的。CH模型有归纳定义的战略类别：步骤0的参与者随机；步骤k的思想者最佳反应，假设其他参与者分布在步骤0到步骤k-1。这个模型符合经验数据，并解释了为什么均衡理论在一些游戏中预测得很好，而在另一些游戏中预测得很差。平均1.5步符合许多游戏的数据。
Players in a game are "in equilibrium" if they are rational, and accurately predict other players' strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is "cognitive hierarchy" ( CH) theory, where each player assumes that his strategy is the most sophisticated. The CH model has inductively defined strategic categories: step 0 players randomize; and step k thinkers best-respond, assuming that other players are distributed over step 0 through step k-1. This model fits empirical data, and explains why equilibrium theory predicts behavior well in some games and poorly in others. An average of 1.5 steps fits data from many games.