I could be you: The phenomenological dimension of social understanding
I could be you: The phenomenological dimension of social understanding
复制标题
DOI：
10.1080/019697297126074
复制
发表时间：
1997-07-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Dautenhahn, K
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dautenhahn, K
本文探讨了社会理解的现象学维度。作者的一般假设是，生物代理人(尤其是人类)表现出的复杂形式的社会理解基于两种机制：(1)强调共鸣的身体、经验动态和(2)交流情境的传记重建。后者需要代理人的身体经验作为重建过程的参照点。这一假说源于哲学、自然科学和认知科学中关于认知和理解的社会体现的讨论。证据来自对灵长类动物、婴儿和自闭症患者的社会认知研究，这些研究被解释为“心智体验”假说。论文的第二部分概述了一个研究机器人与其环境的动态耦合的“交互”实验。这个例子被用来讨论人类观察者和设计者作为一个积极的、具体化的代理人的角色，他偏向于根据意向性和解释来解释世界。本文描述了这一方面如何影响对自主机器人代理行为的理解和解释过程。作者最后强调，为了开发复杂的人工系统，需要克服计算主义和现象学之间的区别。
This paper discusses the phenomenological dimension of social understanding. The author's general hypothesis is that complex forms of social understanding that biological agents (especially humans) show are based on two mechanisms: (1) the bodily, experiential dynamics of emphatic resonance and (2) the biographic reconstruction of a communication situation. The latter requires the agent's bodily experiences as the point of reference for the reconstruction process. This hypothesis is derived from discussions in philosophy, natural sciences, and cognitive science on the social embodiment of cognition and understanding. Evidence comes from studies on social cognition in primates, infants, and autistic people that are interpreted in terms of the ''mind-experiencing'' hypothesis. The second part of the paper sketches an ''interactive'' experiment that investigates the dynamic coupling of a robot with its environment. This example is used to discuss the role of the human observer and designer as an active, embodied agent who is biased toward interpreting the world in terms of intentionality and explanation. The paper describes how this aspect can influence the processes of understanding and interpretation of the behavior of autonomous robotic agents. The author concludes by stressing the need to overcome the distinction between computationalism and phenomenology in order to develop complex artificial systems.