Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining
Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining
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连续讨价还价的市场均衡
DOI：
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发表时间：
1985
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Wolinsky
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Rubinstein;A. Wolinsky
本文考虑了一个市场，对代理人谁有兴趣进行交易的随机过程带到一起，并在会议上，启动一个讨价还价的过程中的交易条款。基本的讨价还价问题是用战略方法来处理的。本文推导了稳态均衡协议;分析了它们对市场条件（例如不同类型代理人的相对数量）的依赖性;并讨论了它们与竞争均衡结果和搜索均衡文献中其他结果的关系。本文考虑一个以下列方式运作的市场。在执行交易中具有共同利益的代理人对通过随机过程聚集在一起。当两个代理人见面时，他们会就交易条款展开讨价还价。如果两个代理人达成协议，交易发生，他们离开市场。当然，在任何一次会议上，谈判的地位及所达成的协议，都会受到当时市场情况的影响。这些因素包括：如果当前谈判中的协议被推迟，谈判各方与其他合作伙伴会面的机会;实现替代交易所需的预期时间长度，以及替代合作伙伴的预期行为。对这种市场机制的研究有两个原因。首先，它捕捉了某些特定市场中贸易的一些现实方面（例如，资产市场，如住房和一些劳动力市场）。其次，它有助于理解价格形成的微观机制及其在形成市场结果方面的作用。在这两种情况下，所研究的特点在很大程度上被传统的市场均衡分析所忽视。相关文献包括Diamond [4，5]、Diamond和Maskin [6]、Mortensen [8，9]以及Zusman和Bell [13]的文章。这些文章考虑了上述类型的市场，在这种市场中，交易是在代理人的成对会议上达成的。我们的工作和这些文章之间的主要区别在于对基本谈判问题的处理方法。在所引用的文章中，假设会议结束时达成了一项即时协议，该协议以任意预定的方式分割相关的盈余（当盈余被假设为平均分配时，分配规则实际上是纳什公理化的谈判解决方案）。与此相反，本文用战略方法（见Rubinstein [19]）来处理基本的讨价还价问题，这构成了一种试图研究讨价还价黑箱的尝试。这种方法明确地模拟了讨价还价过程的时间维度，详细描述了讨价还价的过程，并证明了协议是一个完美的均衡，
This paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and, upon meeting, initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction. The basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach. The paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements; analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types; and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature. THIS PAPER CONSIDERS a market that operates in the following way. Pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process. When two agents meet, they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction. If two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market. Of course, the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market. These will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed; also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction, and the expected behavior of alternative partners. The study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons. Firstly, it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets (e.g., asset markets such as housing and some labor markets). Secondly, it contributes to an understanding of the micro-mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes. In both cases, the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses. The related literature includes the articles by Diamond [4, 5], Diamond and Maskin [6], Mortensen [8, 9], and Zusman and Bell [13]. These articles consider markets of the type described above, in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents. The major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem. In the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way (when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally, the division rule is, in fact, Nash's axiomatic bargaining solution). In contrast, the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach (see Rubinstein [19]) which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black-box. This approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process, describes in-detail the bargaining procedure, and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in