Ecological constraints on internal representation: resonant kinematics of perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming.
Ecological constraints on internal representation: resonant kinematics of perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming.
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DOI：
10.1037/0033-295x.91.4.417
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发表时间：
1984-10
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
R. Shepard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Shepard
查尔斯定理的二维例子提供了内化约束的抽象性的最简单的说明。从物理动力学的考虑，人们可能会猜测，两个平面图形在任意不同的位置交替呈现（因此通过平移和旋转，如图2的面板f）会产生表观运动，其中表面运动物体的质心在其两个端点位置之间穿过最短的直线。因为两个视图也因旋转而不同，这样的运动必须伴随着一个额外的、明显的旋转变换，如图3 a部分中两个矩形所示。然而，福斯特（1975）发现了图3，而不是这样的双重变换。一个矩形（用细线画）在相同的两个矩形（用粗线画）之间的中间位置，这两个矩形在位置和方向上都任意不同，沿着一条由直线平移和旋转组合的路径（a部分），和一条只由旋转组成的路径（福斯特，1975年，发现在表观运动中更受欢迎）（b部分）。（来自R. N. Shepard和L. a . Cooper， 1982年，第316页）。麻省理工学院1982年版权所有。经许可改编)，运动通常是在弯曲的路径上经历的。通过观察人士调整变量中间矩形(由细线如图3所示),出现下降的道路上运动,他发现(在有利条件下)运动往往是经验丰富的在这独特的圆形轨道,严格进行图到另一个由一个旋转大约一个定点,P,在平面上,如图3所示,b部分。这里,似乎像莫尔条纹的玻璃(1969;如图4 b部分所示，视觉系统挑选出平面上刚性构型的两个位置所暗示的固定点，从而通过简单的旋转来相互识别这两个构型。（见Foster， 1975.1978; Shepard, 1981b；关于回顾和理论讨论，见Shepard & Cooper， 4）在一项由类似目标驱动的视运动研究中，Warren（1977）报告说，因仿射变换而不同的二维形状之间的交替不会产生刚性视运动。然而，他所谓的仿射对（图g）并不是仿射的，他的指示和由此产生的主观报告对解释、标准选择、感知集或期望的影响等问题都是开放的。426罗杰·谢泼德图4。Glass（1969）描述的云纹图案，其中两个相同的随机纹理透明（a部分），当以任意错位的方式叠加时，会产生同心圆的外观（b部分）。（当一个透明相对于另一个透明移动时，同心圆的中心在正交方向上移动。）1982年)。顺便说一句，视觉系统也在非刚性变换的情况下提取固定点，正如Johansson (1951,1973), Wallach（1965/ 1976）所证明的那样，最广泛的是Cutting和他的同事（见Cutting, 1981; Cutting & Proffitt, 1982）。有很好的理由说明为什么感知系统的自动操作应该更多地由运动几何的一般原理来指导，而不是由控制特定对象的不同可能行为的特定原理来指导。查尔斯定理将物体的每一个半刚性部分的运动，在每一个时刻，限制为一个简单的，六自由度的扭转运动，包括纯旋转或纯平移的极限情况。相比之下，特定物体（一片落叶、一根漂浮的树枝、一只潜水的鸟或一只猛扑过来的猫）的更持久的运动具有更大的自由度，它们对许多不可知因素（风、水流、记忆或意图）的反应截然不同。此外，相对于快速移动的观察者，即使是非刚性、非实体或瞬态物体（蛇、灌木、波浪、云或缕缕烟雾）的空间变换也表现得像刚性物体的变换（Shepard & Cooper, 1982）。因此，在表观运动中显示的自动知觉实现既不尝试不可能的预测，也不尝试从许多适合于特定物体的自然运动中任意选择一种运动，这并不奇怪。相反，它只是通过独特的、最简单的刚性运动来实例化对象的持续存在，这种运动将一个视图带入另一个视图，并且它以一种与观察者或被观察对象的运动兼容的方式这样做。可能一些普遍的物理动力学原理（如动量原理），以及更抽象的纯运动学几何原理，已经内化到影响表观运动的程度（Foster & Gravano, 1982; Freyd, 1983）。1983c, 1983d, 1983e；弗雷德和芬克，1984；Ramachandran & Anstis, 1983)。但很明显，所呈现的特定对象很少或根本没有效果。当一个物体的图像先在一个地方出现，然后在另一个地方出现时，不管这幅图像是一片树叶还是一只猫，我们不由自主地体验到的运动既不是飞舞的飘动，也不是猛扑；在这两种情况下，都是最简单的刚性位移。的确，我们可能会想象一片叶子扑下来或一只猫扑下来，但在这样做时，我们自愿进行了更复杂的模拟（就像我们想象一片叶子扑下来或一只猫扑下来一样）。这种心理模拟可能受到内化物理动力学甚至动物行为的更具体原则的指导。时间和距离的普遍约束我已经采取了迄今为止被认为是世界上相应约束的感知约束的来源，例如，24小时的昼夜循环和运动几何原理，也许还有物理动力学原理。然而，还有其他高度有序的感知规律，它们可能不是碰巧在我们的世界中盛行的约束的反映，而是在这个世界上任何可能存在的系统中不可避免的约束的表现。因此，就像光速限制了遥远的物体之间的通信速度一样，信号的必然有限速度
ness of Internalized Perceptual Constraints The two-dimensional case of Chasles's theorem provides the simplest illustration of the abstractness of the internalized constraints. From considerations of physical dynamics, one might guess that two planar figures alternately presented in positions that differ arbitrarily (and hence by both a translation and a rotation, as in Panel f of Figure 2) would give rise to an apparent motion in which the center of mass of the apparently moving body traverses the shortest, straight line between its two terminal positions. Because the two views also differ by a rotation, such a motion would have to be accompanied by an additional, apparent rotational transformation, as illustrated for two rectangles in Figure 3, Part a. Instead of such a double transformation, however, Foster (1975) found Figure 3. Intermediate positions of a rectangle (drawn in thin lines) between the same two rectangles (drawn in heavy lines), which differ arbitrarily in both position and orientation, along a path consisting of a combined rectilinear translation and a rotation (Part a), and the path (which Foster, 1975, found to be preferred in apparent motion) consisting of a rotation only (Part b). (From Mental Images and Their Transformations by R. N. Shepard and L. A. Cooper, 1982, p. 316. Copyright 1982 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Adapted by permission.) that the motion is generally experienced over a curved path. By having observers adjust the variable intermediate rectangle (indicated in Figure 3 by thinner lines) so that it appeared to fall on the path of motion, he found that (under conducive conditions) the motion tended to be experienced over that unique circular path that rigidly carries the one figure into the other by a single rotation about a fixed point, P, in the plane, as shown in Figure 3, Part b. It seems that here, as in the case of the moire pattern of Glass (1969; an example of which is shown in Figure 4, Part b), the visual system picks out the fixed point implied by the two presented positions of a rigid configuration in the plane and, hence, identifies the two configurations with each other by means of a simple rotation. (See Foster, 1975, 1978; Shepard, 1981b; and for a review and theoretical discussion, Shepard & Cooper, 4 In an investigation of apparent motion motivated by similar objectives, Warren (1977) reported that alternation between two-dimensional shapes differing by an affine transformation did not yield rigid apparent motion. However his allegedly affine pair (Panel g) was not affine, and his instructions and resulting subjective reports are open to questions of interpretation, choice of criterion, and effects of perceptual set or expectancy. 426 ROGER N. SHEPARD Figure 4. Moire pattern described by Glass (1969), in which two identical transparencies of a random texture (Part a), when superimposed in an arbitrary misalignment, give rise to the appearance of concentric circles (Part b). (As one transparency is shifted with respect to the other, the center of the concentric circles moves in an orthogonal direction.) 1982.) Incidentally, the visual system also extracts fixed points in the case of nonrigid transformations, as has been demonstrated by Johansson (1950, 1973), Wallach (1965/ 1976), and most extensively by Cutting and his associates (see Cutting, 1981; Cutting & Proffitt, 1982). There are good reasons why the automatic operations of the perceptual system should be guided more by general principles of kinematic geometry than by specific principles governing the different probable behaviors of particular objects. Chasles's theorem constrains the motion of each semirigid part of a body, during each moment of time, to a simple, six-degrees-of-freedom twisting motion, including the limiting cases of pure rotations or translations. By contrast, the more protracted motions of particular objects (a falling leaf, floating stick, diving bird, or pouncing cat) have vastly more degrees of freedom that respond quite differently to many unknowable factors (breezes, currents, memories, or intentions). Moreover, relative to a rapidly moving observer, the spatial transformations of even nonrigid, insubstantial, or transient objects (snakes, bushes, waves, clouds, or wisps of smoke) behave like the transformations of rigid objects (Shepard & Cooper, 1982). It is not surprising then that the automatic perceptual impletion that is revealed in apparent motion does not attempt either the impossible prediction or the arbitrary selection of one natural motion out of the many appropriate to the particular object. Rather, it simply instantiates the continuing existence of the object by means of the unique, simplest rigid motion that will carry the one view into the other, and it does so in a way that is compatible with a movement either of the observer or of the object observed. Possibly some pervasive principles of physical dynamics (such as a principle of momentum), in addition to the more abstract principles of purely kinematic geometry, have been internalized to the extent that they influence apparent motion (Foster & Gravano, 1982; Freyd, 1983a,. 1983c, 1983d, 1983e; Freyd & Finke, 1984; Ramachandran & Anstis, 1983). But there evidently is little or no effect of the particular object presented. The motion we involuntarily experience when a picture of an object is presented first in one place and then in another, whether the picture is of a leaf or of a cat, is neither a fluttering drift nor a pounce; it is, in both cases, the same simplest, rigid displacement. True, we may imagine a leaf fluttering down or a cat pouncing, but in doing so we voluntarily undertake a more complex simulation (just as we might in imagining a leaf pouncing or a cat fluttering down). Such mental simulations may be guided by internalizations of more specific principles of physical dynamics and even perhaps of animal behavior. Pervasive Constraints of Time and Distance I have taken the sources of the perceptual constraints considered so far to be corresponding constraints in the world, for example, the 24-hour diurnal cycle and principles of kinematic geometry and perhaps of physical dynamics. However, there are other highly orderly perceptual regularities that may not be reflections of constraints that happened to prevail in our world so much as manifestations of constraints that are unavoidable in any system that could exist in this world. Thus, much as the velocity of light limits the speed of communication between distant bodies, the necessarily finite velocity of signal ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS ON INTERNAL REPRESENTATION 427