Peer pressure in an agency relationship
Peer pressure in an agency relationship
复制标题
DOI：
10.1086/209832
复制
发表时间：
1997-04-01
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Gjerde, KP
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Barron, JM;Gjerde, KP
我们调查的作用，同侪压力的影响，提供给从事团队生产的工人的最佳激励方案。我们开发了一个机构模型的同行警务，以确定影响相互监督的程度的因素。由于负责人必须补偿工人的监督工作和同伴压力对工人造成的成本，因此引入同伴压力会改变最佳补偿方案。我们建立的条件下，校长减少边际补偿规则，以减少监测工作。因此，同伴压力为团队环境中薪酬与产出之间的联系减少提供了理由。
We investigate the role of peer pressure in influencing the optimal incentive scheme offered to workers engaged in team production. We develop an agency model of peer policing to identify factors that affect the extent of mutual monitoring. As the principal must compensate workers for their monitoring efforts and the costs that peer pressure imposes on workers, introducing peer pressure alters the optimal compensation package. We establish conditions under which the principal reduces the marginal compensation rule to reduce monitoring efforts. As such, peer pressure provides a rationale for a reduced link between compensation and output in a team setting.