Hamilton’s rule and kin competition in a finite kin population

Hamilton’s rule and kin competition in a finite kin population
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汉密尔顿的规则和有限亲属人口中的亲属竞争

DOI:
10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110862
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发表时间:
2021
影响因子:
2
通讯作者:
Ting Ji
Ting Ji
中科院分区:
生物学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Qiao-Qiao He;Xiu-Deng Zheng;Ruth Mace;Yi Tao;Ting Ji

文献摘要

相似文献

亲属选择意味着个体可以通过对亲属表现出更多的利他性来增加自己的包容适应度。因此,汉密尔顿法则认为,如果相关系数超过利他行为的成本收益比,亲属选择就会起作用。然而,一些研究表明,由于亲属间的利他行为而产生的亲缘竞争会降低甚至完全否定利他行为对亲属的亲缘选择效益。为了理解在一般的理论框架下,亲属选择和亲属竞争如何影响合作的演化,我们在这里考虑有限亲属种群中合作的演化动力学,其中亲属竞争被纳入到亲属之间的简单囚徒困境博弈中。与以往的研究不同,我们强调了相互利他行为和单方面利他行为对亲属竞争影响的差异可能对合作的演化起着重要作用。主要结果不仅揭示了在亲属竞争下汉密尔顿规则仍然有效的条件,而且揭示了有限亲属群体中合作进化的进化生物学机制。
Kin selection means that individuals can increase their own inclusive fitness through displaying more altruistically toward their relatives. So, Hamilton’s rule says kin selection will work if the coefficient of relatedness exceeds the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act. However, some studies have shown that.the kin competition due to the altruism among relatives can reduce, and even totally negate, the kinselected benefits of altruism toward relatives. In order to understand how the evolution of cooperation is influenced by both kin selection and kin competition under a general theoretical framework, we here.consider the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a finite kin population, where kin competition is incorporated into a simple Prisoner’s Dilemma game between relatives. Differently from the previous studies, we emphasize that the difference between the effects of mutually and unilaterally altruistic acts.on kin competition may play an important role for the evolution of cooperation. The main results not only show the conditions that Hamilton’s rule still works under the kin competition but also reveal the evolutionary biological mechanism driving the evolution of cooperation in a finite kin population.