Fairness in Selling to the Newsvendor
Fairness in Selling to the Newsvendor
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DOI：
10.1111/poms.12222
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发表时间：
2013-11
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Xiaole Wu;Julie A. Niederhoff
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xiaole Wu;Julie A. Niederhoff
本文研究了公平性问题对两方报童供应链绩效的影响。我们扩展到广泛的需求分布的先验公平性分析，也允许公平性的程度和定义，以承担更广泛的偏好比以前的文献。与以往的文献相反，我们发现，如果零售商的理想分配给供应商是不够大，无论需求的变化，一个公平的零售商没有区别，系统效率时，面对传统的利润最大化的供应商。只有当零售商对供应商的理想分配高于一个阈值时，零售商的公平性关注才能在足够高的需求不确定性下提高系统效率。为了使零售商的公平性关注能够提高供应链双方的期望利润（双赢），需求的不确定性不能太低，零售商对不利的不公平并不是很反感，他对供应商的理想分配是在一个特定的范围内。如果只有供应商关心公平，结果是从恶化到改善（但不是协调）系统，双赢的局面是不可能的。最后，当供应商和零售商都是公平的，SCP得到改善，除非双方都愿意将系统利润的一小部分分配给另一方。再次，只有当需求的不确定性足够高，零售商的理想配置在一定范围内，并且他对不利的不公平不是很反感时，才能实现双赢。
This paper studies the impact of fairness concerns on supply chain performance (SCP) in the two‐party newsvendor setting. We extend prior fairness analysis to a wide range of demand distributions, and also allow the degree and definition of fairness to assume a broader range of preferences than those in prior literature. Contrary to prior literature, we find that if the retailer's ideal allocation to the supplier is not sufficiently large, regardless of demand variability, a fair‐minded retailer makes no difference to system efficiency when facing a traditional profit‐maximizing supplier. Only when the retailer's ideal allocation to the supplier is above a threshold can the retailer's fairness concern improve the system efficiency for sufficiently high demand uncertainty. In order for the retailer's fairness concern to improve expected profits of both parties compared to the traditional supply chain case (win–win), the demand uncertainty cannot be too low, the retailer is not very averse to disadvantageous inequity, and his ideal allocation to the supplier is within a specific range. If only the supplier is concerned for fairness, the results range from worsening to improving (but not coordinating) the system and a win–win situation is impossible. Finally, when both the supplier and retailer are fair‐minded, SCP is improved unless both parties prefer to allocate small portions of system profit to the other. Again, win–win will be achieved only when the demand uncertainty is sufficiently high, the retailer's ideal allocation is within a certain range, and he is not very averse to disadvantageous inequity.