Supply chain scheduling: Conflict and cooperation in assembly systems
Supply chain scheduling: Conflict and cooperation in assembly systems
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DOI：
10.1287/opre.1070.0412
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发表时间：
2007-11-01
影响因子：
2.7
通讯作者：
Hall, Nicholas G.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chen, Zhi-Long;Hall, Nicholas G.
我们研究供应链制造中的冲突与合作问题。考虑一个装配系统，其中供应商向制造商提供零件。在所有零件都供应之前，产品无法交付。制造商执行非瓶颈操作，例如，每个产品的外包装配，包装和交付。两个经典的调度目标被认为是：最小化的总完工时间和最大延迟。我们分析了如何远离最优的供应商的调度问题的最佳时间表可以为相应的制造商的问题，反之亦然。为了解决这些冲突，我们考虑四种替代方案的供应商和制造商的相对议价能力，并在每种情况下描述一个实用的机制，决策者之间的合作。在这些情况下，评估冲突的成本和合作的好处，需要解决供应商，制造商和整个系统的各种调度问题。对于所有这些排序问题，我们提供了一个有效的算法或证明的棘手性。此外，对于两个问题，我们表明是棘手的，我们描述的算法，并分析其最坏情况下的性能或证明渐近最优，他们的解决方案。我们证明计算的成本节约实现决策者之间的合作是显着的，在许多情况下。扩展我们的模型，考虑在制造商和运输时间的瓶颈操作也被开发。
We study conflict and cooperation issues in supply chain manufacturing. Consider an assembly system where suppliers provide parts to a manufacturer. A product cannot be delivered until all its parts have been supplied. The manufacturer performs nonbottleneck operations, for example, outsourced assembly, packaging, and delivery for each product. Two classical scheduling objectives are considered: minimization of the total completion time and of the maximum lateness. We analyze how far from optimal the best schedule for a suppliers' scheduling problem can be for the corresponding manufacturer's problem, and vice versa. To resolve these conflicts, we consider four alternative scenarios for the relative bargaining power of the suppliers and the manufacturer, and in each case describe a practical mechanism for cooperation between the decision makers. Evaluating the cost of conflict and the benefit of cooperation in these scenarios requires the solution of various scheduling problems by the suppliers, the manufacturer, and the overall system. For all these scheduling problems, we provide either an efficient algorithm or a proof of intractability. Moreover, for two problems that we show are intractable, we describe heuristics and analyze their worst case performance or demonstrate asymptotic optimality, of their solutions. We demonstrate computationally that the cost saving realized by cooperation between the decision makers is significant in many cases. Extensions of our models to consider bottleneck operations at the manufacturer and transportation times are also developed.