The rationality of splitting equally
The rationality of splitting equally
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DOI：
10.1016/s0167-2681(96)00026-1
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发表时间：
1997-03-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Bolton, GE
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bolton, GE
传统的经济模型似乎无法捕捉到实验室中观察到的50-50谈判分工的倾向。实验进一步表明，通常的经济参数集之外的东西系统地影响谈判解决方案。我从生物学的角度研究了一个简单的讨价还价模型。有限进化稳定策略FAIRMAN会做出50-50的出价，惩罚更多的要求，并利用更少的要求。当讨价还价者可以使用一个信号来区分合作伙伴时，50-50是进化稳定结果的唯一极限。研究结果表明，一些社会习俗之所以持续存在，是因为它们以进化稳定的方式促进了效率。
Conventional economic models seem unable to capture the propensity for 50-50 bargaining divisions observed in the lab. Experiments further suggest that something outside the usual set of economic parameters systematically influences bargaining settlements. I examine a simple bargaining model from a biological perspective. A limit evolutionarily stable strategy, FAIRMAN, makes 50-50 offers, punishes demands for more, and exploits demands for less. Fairman involves strategy perturbations resembling probes for concessions. When bargainers can use a signal to discriminate among partners, 50-50 is the unique limit evolutionarily stable outcome. The results suggest that some social conventions persist because they promote efficiency in an evolutionarily stable manner.