Experimental Analysis of Corporate Wage Negotiations Based on the Ultimatum Game: A New Approach Using a Combination of Laboratory and fMRI Experiments
Experimental Analysis of Corporate Wage Negotiations Based on the Ultimatum Game: A New Approach Using a Combination of Laboratory and fMRI Experiments
复制标题
基于最后通牒博弈的企业工资谈判实验分析:实验室与功能磁共振成像实验相结合的新方法
DOI:
10.1007/s10614-017-9769-2
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Yoshinori Yamakawa
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Hidetoshi Yamaji;Masatoshi Gotoh;Yoshinori Yamakawa
Workers who have limited wealth are also at a disadvantage in terms of income distribution. In accounting this brings to mind the way in which managers may limit wages by manipulating accounting information when negotiating with workers. While researchers have investigated whether or not managers manipulate information to keep workers’ wages low, they have rarely been able to produce sufficient empirical evidence to support their arguments. So we seek to bridge this gap between the present conditions and academic research. Focusing on the recent tendency for labor-management negotiations to take the form of individual bargaining between managers and workers, we conduct experiments of psychology and perform neuro-experiments using fMRI. It was found that a trend existed where managers who had a high level of empathy and would normally be expected to recognize workers’ difficult circumstances, conversely tended to compel workers to accept unfavorable outcomes.