The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
复制标题
战时谈判的趋同原则
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Branislav L. Slantchev
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Branislav L. Slantchev
如果战争是由对相对实力的分歧引起的，那么当对手对彼此有足够的了解时，战争就结束了。学习发生在信息被战略操纵的谈判行为和不可操纵的战场结果所揭示的时候。我提出了一个模型，同时讨价还价和战斗中，双方球员都可以提供和不对称信息存在的权力分配。在马尔可夫完美序列均衡中，提出和拒绝提议的信息价值超过了战场提供的信息价值。然而，国家使用这两种信息来源来学习和解决军事胜利之前。趋同原则认为，当战争失去其信息内容时，它就不再有用，而对失败（胜利）的信念并不是终止（发起）敌对行动的必要条件。因此，国际关系中试图解释双方战前乐观情绪的标准难题可能并不那么相关。
If war results from disagreement about relative strength, then it ends when opponents learn enough about each other. Learning occurs when information is revealed by strategically manipulable negotiation behavior and nonmanipulable battlefield outcomes. I present a model of simultaneous bargaining and fighting where both players can make offers and asymmetric information exists about the distribution of power. In the Markov perfect sequential equilibrium, making and rejecting offers has informational value that outweighs the one provided by the battlefield. However, states use both sources of information to learn and settle before military victory. The Principle of Convergence posits that warfare ceases to be useful when it loses its informational content and that belief in defeat (victory) is not necessary to terminate (initiate) hostilities. Thus, the standard puzzle in international relations that seeks to account for prewar optimism on both sides may not be that relevant.