Financial Reconstruction in Conflict and 'Post-Conflict' Economies
Financial Reconstruction in Conflict and 'Post-Conflict' Economies
复制标题
冲突和“冲突后”经济体的金融重建
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Stein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Lewis;H. Stein
本文讨论了受冲突影响国家金融部门重建的一些主要问题，重点是货币改革、中央银行的重建（或创建）、银行体系的振兴及其审慎监管。不同类型的冲突对金融体系有不同的影响。因此，各国重建的优先事项也相应不同。然而，在重建过程中却反复出现以下问题。首先，中央银行往往仍然软弱且资源不足。其后果是金融体系的监管随意且宽松，而商业银行的会计和报告标准经常宽松，加剧了这种情况。这阻碍了巴塞尔核心原则等国际审慎监管模式的应用。其次，监管宽容现象很常见，这既反映了央行的技术弱点，也反映了横跨国家机构和金融部门的强大利益集团（包括战犯）的压力。其后果是银行牌照宽松、内部借贷、风险暴露过多以及普遍未能遏制银行突发危机。这些反过来又破坏了从战争中恢复的经济的稳定，银行危机的财政负担限制了发展和贫困支出，从而威胁到“冲突后”重建本身。
This paper discusses some of the principal issues relating to the reconstruction of the financial sector in conflict-affected countries, focusing on currency reform, the rebuilding (or creation) of central banks, the revitalization of the banking system, and its prudential supervision and regulation. Different types of conflict have different effects on the financial system. Country priorities for reconstruction therefore vary accordingly. Nevertheless, the following problems repeatedly occur in reconstruction. First, central banks often remain weak and under-resourced. The consequence is haphazard and lenient supervision of the financial system, which is compounded by the frequently lax accounting and reporting standards of commercial banks. This hinders the application of international models of prudential supervision, such as the Basle Core Principles. Second, regulatory forbearance is common, reflecting both the technical weakness of central banks, but also the pressure of powerful interests—including war criminals—that straddle both state institutions and the financial sector. The consequences are leniency in the licensing of banks, insider-lending, excessive risk exposure, and a general failure to curb emergent bank crises. These in turn destabilize economies in recovery from war, and the fiscal burden of bank crises limits development and poverty spending—thereby threatening ‘postconflict’ reconstruction itself.