Learning from disaster.
Learning from disaster.
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DOI:
10.1136/bmj.302.6773.414-c
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发表时间:
1991-02
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
D. Dodwell
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
D. Dodwell
SIR,-There are several errors in the letter by Drs Martin Sandler and Peter Mayer' commenting on our papers.`24 It suggested that planned readmissions were included in the numerator of a readmission rate. They were not included. It also suggested that day cases were included in the numerator. Day case admissions are invariably planned and would therefore also be excluded. The letter suggested that deaths were accidentally excluded from the denominator. In fact, deaths were purposely excluded. A person who has died is no longer at risk of being readmitted and therefore cannot be included in the numerator. Standard epidemiological practice suggests that he or she should also be excluded from the denominator. The letter suggested that the case notes of a substantial proportion of readmitted patients selected for individual audit were unavailable. In fact, case notes were available for 74 of the 93 patients readmitted (79%): a respectable "response rate." We agree, however, that some element of selection bias might be in play, although we think it unwise to speculate whether patients whose case notes were unavailable would be more likely to fall into the category of avoidable or unavoidable readmissions. We entirely disagree that a useful outcome indicator will always be subject to perverse incentives. Readmission rate (however measured) if used as an indicator of outcome is particularly subject to perverse incentives because a readmission rate is a particularly bad and uninterpretable proxy for outcome. It is hard to see how a valid outcome indicator-a true measurement of improvement in health status-could cause perverse incentives. AILEEN CLARKE