The Logic of Tests of Significance
The Logic of Tests of Significance
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意义检验的逻辑
DOI：
10.1086/288590
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发表时间：
1974
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Stephen Spielman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Stephen Spielman
尽管奈曼-皮尔逊检验理论是统计检验的官方理论，但社会科学中的大多数研究出版物都使用了一种归纳推理模式，这是费舍尔显著性检验的特征。这种推理模式的确切结构和基本原理被广泛误解。本文的目的是精确地描述模式及其基本原理，并表明，虽然它比费舍尔的批评者所意识到的更有说服力，但它并不能在逻辑上支持它所认可的推论。
In spite of the fact that the Neyman-Pearson theory of testing is the official theory of statistical testing, most research publications in the social sciences use a pattern of inductive reasoning that is characteristic of Fisherian tests of significance. The exact structure and rationale of this pattern of reasoning is widely misunderstood. The goal of the paper is to describe precisely the pattern and its rationale, and to show that while it is far more cogent than Fisher's critics have realized, it does not logically sustain the inferences it sanctions.