Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games
复制标题
信号游戏中的学习和类型兼容性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kevin He
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Fudenberg;Kevin He
信号游戏中会出现哪种平衡取决于接收者如何解释游戏路径的偏差。我们为这些偏离路径的信念建立了微观基础，并在一个模型中进行了相关的平衡细化，在该模型中，平衡是通过患者和长寿的发送者和接收者群体的非平衡学习而产生的。在我们的模型中，年轻的发送者不确定游戏的主要分布，因此他们理性地发送非平衡信号作为实验，以了解接收者群体的行为。发送者类型的收益函数的差异为这些实验产生了不同的激励。使用 Gittins 指数（Gittins，1979），我们描述了哪些发送者类型更频繁地使用每个信号，从而导致基于“类型兼容性”对接收者的偏离路径信念的约束，从而导致基于学习的平衡选择。
Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where equilibrium arises through non-equilibrium learning by populations of patient and long-lived senders and receivers. In our model, young senders are uncertain about the prevailing distribution of play, so they rationally send out-of-equilibrium signals as experiments to learn about the behavior of the population of receivers. Differences in the payoff functions of the types of senders generate different incentives for these experiments. Using the Gittins index (Gittins, 1979), we characterize which sender types use each signal more often, leading to a constraint on the receiver's off-path beliefs based on "type compatibility" and hence a learning-based equilibrium selection.
DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1618780114
发表时间：
2016-08
期刊：
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
影响因子：
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作者：
D. Fudenberg;Kevin He;L. Imhof
通讯作者：
D. Fudenberg;Kevin He;L. Imhof