Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation
Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation
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国内政治制度、可信承诺和国际合作
DOI：
10.2307/2991814
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
B. Leeds
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Leeds
我认为，国内政治制度对领导人在国际体系中建立双边合作的能力的影响。在不同的国内制度环境中运作的领导人有不同的能力，可以对未来的行动方针做出合理的承诺，接受政策失败的代价，并适应国际环境的变化。运用博弈论，我推断的假设国内制度结构的影响，合作的可能性。我的模型表明，联合民主和联合专制的二人组比一个民主国家和一个专制国家组成的二人组更容易合作。COPDAB事件数据的分析揭示了与这些假设相称的证据。本研究表明，国际合作理论将受益于考虑国内政治对领导人决策的影响，但这种影响只能在国际体系中的战略行为的背景下才能充分理解。
I consider the influence of domestic political institutions on the ability of leaders to establish bilateral cooperation in the international system. Leaders operating in different domestic institutional environments have differing abilities to commit credibly to future courses of action, to accept the costs of policy failures, and to adjust to changes in the international environment. Using game theory, I deduce hypotheses about the effects of domestic institutional structures on the likelihood of cooperation. My model suggests that jointly democratic dyads and jointly autocratic dyads will cooperate more readily than dyads composed of one democracy and one autocracy. Analysis of COPDAB events data reveals evidence commensurate with these hypotheses. This research suggests that international cooperation theory will benefit from consideration of the influence of domestic politics on leaders' decisions, but that this influence can only be fully understood in the context of strategic behavior in the international system.