Discursive versus information-processing perspectives on a Bioethical problem - The case of 'Unrealistic' patient expectations

Discursive versus information-processing perspectives on a Bioethical problem - The case of 'Unrealistic' patient expectations
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DOI:
10.1177/0959354304042016
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发表时间:
2004-04-01
影响因子:
1.2
通讯作者:
Weinfurt, KP
Weinfurt, KP
中科院分区:
心理学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Weinfurt, KP

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本文讨论了一个例子,如何采用不同的理论观点的人可以有实际意义的领域的生命伦理学。同意接受新的药物治疗而获益机会很小的患者通常报告他们将经历获益的强烈信心。这些“不切实际”的期望被解释为对治疗的错误信念,从而成为知情同意过程失败的证据。这种对病人报告的解释与信息处理框架是一致的,在这个框架中,病人被视为在个人的心理机制中独立存在的信息的传递者。另一方面,从话语心理学的角度来看,病人的报告是在特定的话语语境中为实现特定目标而进行的活动。有人认为,如果生命伦理学家采取的话语的角度来看,一些情况下的“错误信念”可能不会构成生命伦理学问题。
This article discusses an example of how the adoption of different theoretical views of the person can have practical implications for the field of bioethics. Patients who agree to receive new medical treatments with little chance of benefit routinely report strong confidence that they will experience benefit. These 'unrealistic' expectations are interpreted as false beliefs about treatment, and thus as evidence that the informed consent process has failed. This interpretation of patient reports is consistent with an information-processing framework in which the patient is viewed as transmitting information that enjoys an independent existence in the mental machinery of the person. The perspective of discursive psychology, on the other hand, views the patients' reports as activities undertaken to achieve specific aims within particular discursive contexts. It is argued that if bioethicists adopt the discursive perspective, some cases of 'false belief' might not pose a bioethical problem.