A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings
A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings
复制标题
动态设置中多数决定的解决方案概念
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00520.x
复制
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Slavov
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Bernheim;S. Slavov
我们定义并探讨了动态孔多塞赢家（DCW）的概念，它扩展了孔多塞赢家的概念，以动态设置。我们表明，对于每一个DCW，一个大类的动态多数博弈的每一个成员有一个等价的均衡，而其他均衡是不是类似的便携式跨这类游戏。当社区成员有足够的耐心时，DCW的存在是有保障的。我们描述可持续和不可持续的结果，研究折扣因子变化的影响，调查效率属性，并探索实现重新谈判证明结果的潜力。我们应用这个解决方案的概念，一个标准的一维选择问题，其中代理商有单峰的偏好，以及一个涉及到一个固定的总回报的划分。
We define and explore the notion of a Dynamic Condorcet Winner (DCW), which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner to dynamic settings. We show that, for every DCW, every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium, and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games. Existence of DCWs is guaranteed when members of the community are sufficiently patient. We characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes, study the effects of changes in the discount factor, investigate efficiency properties, and explore the potential for achieving renegotiation-proof outcomes. We apply this solution concept to a standard one-dimensional choice problem wherein agents have single-peaked preferences, as well as to one involving the division of a fixed aggregate payoff.