The Empirical Effects of Competition on Third‐Degree Price Discrimination in the Presence of Arbitrage
The Empirical Effects of Competition on Third‐Degree Price Discrimination in the Presence of Arbitrage
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套利存在下竞争对三级价格歧视的实证影响
DOI：
10.1111/caje.12285
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Boik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Boik
自Borenstein（1985）和Holmes（1989）以来，出现了理论和实证文献，研究了竞争对第三度价格歧视的影响。由于进行套利所涉及的交易成本通常是无法观察到的，因此这一领域的实证调查在很大程度上仅限于航空旅行等套利很难（如果不是不可能的话）的市场。本文使用一个全新的数据集，记录了在加拿大在线体育博彩市场中存在套利的竞争对价格歧视的影响，其中加拿大球队的价格高于世界市场。我观察了加拿大球队的价格如何实时变化，以响应套利者的存在，这些套利者建立了加拿大体育博彩的可观察边际机会成本。我利用不受套利影响的政府博彩网点的存在，以获得在存在套利的情况下竞争影响价格歧视程度的简化形式反事实估计。在这个新的实证环境中，我发现了与航空公司文献一致的结果：竞争减少了总体价格分散和加价，但“强”市场的分散和加价幅度比“弱”市场更大。
Since Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989), a theoretical and empirical literature has emerged that examines the effects of competition on third-degree price discrimination. Since transaction costs involved in conducting arbitrage are typically unobserved, empirical investigations in this area have largely been restricted to markets such as for air travel where arbitrage is difficult, if not impossible. Using an entirely novel dataset, this paper documents the effect of competition on price discrimination in the presence of arbitrage in the Canadian online sports betting market where prices for Canadian teams are higher than in the world market. I observe how the prices of Canadian teams change in real time in response to the presence of arbitrageurs that establish Canadian sportsbooks’ observable marginal opportunity costs. I exploit the existence of government betting outlets not subject to arbitrage to obtain reduced form counterfactual estimates of the extent to which competition affects price discrimination in the presence of arbitrage. In this new empirical environment, I find results consistent with the airline literature: competition reduces overall price dispersion and markups, but dispersion and markups shrink more for those in the “strong” market than the “weak” market.