Europe, the Market and the Transformation of Democracy
Europe, the Market and the Transformation of Democracy
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欧洲、市场和民主转型
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
W. Bonefeld
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文献类型：
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作者：
W. Bonefeld
帕多阿-斯基奥帕(Padoa-Schioppa，1994：191)对欧洲货币联盟的描述很好地概括了我的文章所关注的问题：“欧洲政治联盟的口号是辅助性的，而不是利维坦。”他解释说，欧洲货币联盟建立在集体决策过程的基础上，这种过程既削弱了国家决策的多元性，又鼓励了各地区分割的国家劳动力市场之间的竞争。这种双重运动植根于欧洲货币联盟的体制结构，这种体制结构将货币的超国家监管与国家对竞争性劳动力市场的责任结合在一起。帕多阿-斯基奥帕·新马基雅维利主义将欧洲货币联盟视为一个非个人化的“集体王子”的观点是恰当的(第151页)。欧洲货币联盟似乎确实将政治归结为政治，归结为技术控制和权力管理领域，这些领域依赖于一套不受直接民主控制的规则。欧洲央行不能接受任何民主机构的指示。它似乎是一个法庭，而不是一个公共政策工具(参看。Grahl，1997)。其目标是增强和保证货币政策的可信度。他说，这是增强可信度的一个方法。。。就是将货币政策的责任分配给一个不受政治影响的机构“(Padoa-Schioppa，1994：188)。因此，可信的货币政策和民主似乎是相互排斥的：货币政策要可信，其在民主决策过程之外的行为似乎会提高其地位。因此，民主被认为使货币政策变得令人难以置信，至少存在政治操纵的风险，货币政策政治化，从而扭曲所谓的市场自我监管能力，有利于“特殊利益集团”。因此，人们认为，欧洲货币联盟提供了受宪法保护的规则，保护货币关系不受“非市场”侵蚀。其安全和有效运作的保障是由经济专家提供的，他们的行为不受民主影响和干预。因此，欧洲货币联盟相当于一个制度嵌入和技术官僚监管的
Padoa-Schioppa’s (1994: 191) characterisation of EMU summarises the concerns of my essay well: ‘subsidiarity, not the Leviathan, is the catchword for European political union’. He explains that EMU is based on a collective decision-making process that both undercuts national plurality of decision-making and encourages competition between territorially segmented national labour markets. This double movement is anchored in the institutional structure of EMU that combines the supranational regulation of money with national state responsibility for competitive labour markets. Padoa-Schioppa neoMachiavellian view of EMU as a depersonalised ‘collective prince’ (p. 151) is apt. EMU appears indeed to reduce the political to politics, to the sphere of technical control and management of power which rests on a set of rules outside direct democratic control. The ECB cannot be given instruction by any democratic body. It appears as if it were a court of law rather than an instrument of public policy (cf. Grahl, 1997). Its objective is to enhance and guarantee the credibility of monetary policy. ‘One way to bolster credibility . . . is to assign the responsibility for monetary policy to an institution that is not subject to political influence’ (Padoa-Schioppa, 1994: 188). A credible monetary policy and democracy appear thus mutually exclusive: for monetary policy to be credible, its conduct outside democratic processes of policy making appears to enhance its standing. Democracy is thus deemed to render monetary policy incredible, at least there is the risk of political manipulation, politicising monetary policy and thereby distorting the so-called self-regulating capacity of the market, favouring ‘special interests’. EMU, then, is seen to offer constitutionally safeguarded rules that protect monetary relations from ‘non-market’ encroachments. The guarantee of its safe and effective functioning is furnished by economic experts whose conduct is shielded from democratic influence and interference. EMU amounts thus to an institutionally embedded and technocratically regulated