Information aggregation, rationality, and the condorcet jury theorem
Information aggregation, rationality, and the condorcet jury theorem
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DOI：
10.2307/2082796
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发表时间：
1996-03-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Banks, JS
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
AustenSmith, D;Banks, JS
孔多塞·七月定理指出，当存在关于两个选项中哪一个实际上是我更喜欢的不确定性时，大多数人比任何一个人更有可能选择两个选项中的“更好”。该定理的大多数现存证明都隐含着个人在集体决策中投票“真诚”的行为假设，这是一个看似无害的假设，假设个体被认为具有选择更好的选择的共同偏好。然而，在这里分析的模型中，我们发现，即使个人有这样一个共同的偏好，所有个人的真诚行为是不理性的。特别是，真诚投票并不构成纳什均衡。因此，对于多数人总是比个人“做得更好”这一主张，一个令人满意的理性选择基础还有待推导。
The Condorcet July Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the ''better'' of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact I preferred Most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote ''sincerely'' in the collective decision making, a seemingly innocuous assumption, given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative. However, in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference. In particular, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably ''do better'' than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived.