Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in a Micro-Funded Model of a Monetary Union
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in a Micro-Funded Model of a Monetary Union
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货币联盟小额资助模型中的货币和财政政策相互作用
DOI：
10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.03.001
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Jensen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Beetsma;H. Jensen
本文详细分析了财政稳定政策背后的机制，以及政策承诺在受到供给冲击冲击的两国货币联盟微观新凯恩斯模型中的作用。我们还探讨了财政稳定收益的决定因素。尽管拥有相同工会成员的货币政策关注的是稳定整个欧盟的经济，但财政政策的目标是稳定通胀差异和贸易条件。除了探索最优政策，我们还考虑了货币和财政规则。我们在财政当局的协调和非协调下研究这些规则。
This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade. Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.