Monopoly pricing with negative network effects: The case of vaccines
Monopoly pricing with negative network effects: The case of vaccines
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DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.06.007
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发表时间：
2006-05-01
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
Nuscheler, Robert
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kessing, Sebastian G.;Nuscheler, Robert
我们研究疫苗市场时考虑了需求方的收入异质性和供应方的垄断力量。垄断者有动机利用疫苗接种的外部效应，让穷人更容易受到影响，以增加富人的支付意愿。即使价格歧视的可能性也不能消除这种激励。我们证明，当考虑到收入异质性时，标准政策措施的弱点就会得到缓解。这为以分配为导向的国家或国际公共卫生干预措施提供了基于效率的基本原理。 (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. 保留所有权利。
We study the market for vaccinations considering income heterogeneity on the demand side and monopoly power on the supply side. A monopolist has an incentive to exploit the external effect of vaccinations and leave the poor susceptible in order to increase the willingness to pay the rich. Even the possibility of price discrimination does not remove this incentive. We demonstrate that the weaknesses of standard policy measures are mitigated when income heterogeneity is taken into account. This offers an efficiency based rationale for distribution oriented national or international public health interventions. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.