Making moral machines: why we need artificial moral agents
Making moral machines: why we need artificial moral agents
复制标题
制造道德机器：为什么我们需要人工道德代理人
作者：
Paul Formosa;M. Ryan
随着机器人和人工智能越来越多地融入到丰富的社会环境中，我们似乎不可避免地要把它们变成具备道德技能的道德机器。除了我们如何实现这一目标的技术困难之外，我们还可以提出一个伦理问题，即我们是否应该寻求创造这样的人工道德代理人（AMA）。最近，有几篇论文认为，我们有充分的理由不发展AMA。作为回应，我们对支持和反对创建AMA的相关论点进行了全面分析，我们认为，考虑到所有因素，我们有充分的理由继续负责任地开发AMA。本文的主要贡献有三个方面。首先，对Wynsberghe和Robbins反对AMA的重要论点（在“批判制造人工道德代理人的原因”，科学与工程伦理学25，2019年）提供第一个全面的回应，并在此过程中引入几种新颖的论点。第二，在一篇论文中首次整理和主题化支持和反对AMA的关键论点。第三，将辩论从支持或反对AMA的笼统论点转变为更细致的讨论，即在什么样的背景下使用什么样的AMA，以及出于什么样的目的在道德上是合适的。
As robots and Artificial Intelligences become more enmeshed in rich social contexts, it seems inevitable that we will have to make them into moral machines equipped with moral skills. Apart from the technical difficulties of how we could achieve this goal, we can also ask the ethical question of whether we should seek to create such Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs). Recently, several papers have argued that we have strong reasons not to develop AMAs. In response, we develop a comprehensive analysis of the relevant arguments for and against creating AMAs, and we argue that all things considered we have strong reasons to continue to responsibly develop AMAs. The key contributions of this paper are threefold. First, to provide the first comprehensive response to the important arguments made against AMAs by Wynsberghe and Robbins (in “Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents”, Science and Engineering Ethics 25, 2019) and to introduce several novel lines of argument in the process. Second, to collate and thematise for the first time the key arguments for and against AMAs in a single paper. Third, to recast the debate away from blanket arguments for or against AMAs in general, to a more nuanced discussion about the use of what sort of AMAs, in what sort of contexts, and for what sort of purposes is morally appropriate.