It's all in your head(set): Side-channel attacks on AR/VR systems
It's all in your head(set): Side-channel attacks on AR/VR systems
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发表时间：
2023
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通讯作者：
Yicheng Zhang;Carter Slocum;Jiasi Chen;Nael B. Abu-Ghazaleh
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作者：
Yicheng Zhang;Carter Slocum;Jiasi Chen;Nael B. Abu-Ghazaleh
随着增强现实/虚拟现实(AR/VR)系统越来越多地被采用，安全和隐私问题引起了学术界和工业界的关注。本文论证了AR/VR系统容易受到软件发起的旁路攻击；没有任何特殊权限的恶意应用程序可以推断出关于用户交互、其他并发应用程序甚至周围世界的私人信息。我们针对不同类型的私人信息开发了一些旁路攻击。具体来说，我们展示了三次对受害者交互的攻击，成功恢复了受害者的手势、受害者发出的语音命令和在虚拟键盘上的击键，准确率超过90%。我们还演示了一种应用程序指纹攻击，其中间谍能够识别受害者正在启动的应用程序。最后的攻击表明，敌手可以在真实环境中感知到路人，并估计路人的距离，平均绝对误差(MAE)为10.3厘米。我们相信我们的攻击带来的威胁是紧迫的；它们扩大了我们对这些新兴系统所面临的威胁模型的理解，并为新的AR/VR系统的开发提供了信息，这些系统可以抵御这些威胁。
With the increasing adoption of Augmented Reality/Virtual Reality (AR/VR) systems, security and privacy concerns attract attention from both academia and industry. This paper demonstrates that AR/VR systems are vulnerable to side-channel attacks launched from software; a malicious application without any special permissions can infer private information about user interactions, other concurrent applications, or even the surrounding world. We develop a number of side-channel attacks targeting different types of private information. Specifically, we demonstrate three attacks on the victim’s interactions, successfully recovering hand gestures, voice commands made by victims, and keystrokes on a virtual keyboard, with accuracy exceeding 90%. We also demonstrate an application fingerprinting attack where the spy is able to identify an application being launched by the victim. The final attack demonstrates that the adversary can perceive a bystander in the real-world environment and estimate the bystander’s distance with Mean Absolute Error (MAE) of 10.3 cm. We believe the threats presented by our attacks are pressing; they expand our understanding of the threat model faced by these emerging systems and inform the development of new AR/VR systems that are resistant to these threats.