Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy: An International Study
Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy: An International Study
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.353160
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发表时间：
2003-05
影响因子：
4.4
通讯作者：
Ole‐Kristian Hope
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ole‐Kristian Hope
利用来自22个国家的样本，我调查了分析师盈利预测的准确性与年度报告披露水平之间的关系，以及预测准确性与会计准则执行程度之间的关系。我证明了公司层面的披露与预测准确性呈正相关，这表明这种披露为分析师提供了有用的信息。我构建了一个全面的执法措施，并发现强有力的执法与更高的预测准确性有关。这一发现与一种假设是一致的，即强制执行鼓励管理人员遵循规定的会计规则，这反过来又减少了分析师对未来收益的不确定性。我还发现，有证据表明，当分析师关注度较低时，信息披露更为重要，而当允许在会计方法中有更多选择时，执法更为重要。版权所有芝加哥大学代表专业会计协会，2003年。
Using a sample from 22 countries, I investigate the relations between the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts and the level of annual report disclosure, and between forecast accuracy and the degree of enforcement of accounting standards. I document that firm-level disclosures are positively related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that such disclosures provide useful information to analysts. I construct a comprehensive measure of enforcement and find that strong enforcement is associated with higher forecast accuracy. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that enforcement encourages managers to follow prescribed accounting rules, which, in turn, reduces analysts' uncertainty about future earnings. I also find evidence consistent with disclosures being more important when analyst following is low and with enforcement being more important when more choice among accounting methods is allowed. Copyright University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2003.