Perceptual Content
Perceptual Content
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发表时间：
1994
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最近，经验从根本上说是把世界表现为某种方式的问题，这一论点受到了严肃的关系主义者的质疑。我通过发展一种避免他们反对的知觉内容的观点来捍卫这一论点。我将论证，在对知觉内容的关系性理解上，朴素关系主义的基本见解并不与知觉经验的表征性相竞争。正如它将表明的那样，对经验具有内容这一命题的大多数反对意见，只适用于对知觉内容的说明，在这些说明中，知觉与世界的关系不起任何解释作用。与严格的关系主义者，我将认为，感性经验是根本的关系。但与严肃的关系主义者相反，我认为它从根本上既是关系的，也是代表的。
Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and rep-