Accountability and Information in Elections
Accountability and Information in Elections
复制标题
选举中的问责制和信息
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20150349
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Friedenberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Scott Ashworth;Ethan Bueno de Mesquita;A. Friedenberg
选举被认为通过两个渠道改善选民福利：有效的问责制（即，为政治家付出昂贵努力提供激励）和选举选择（即，保留具有选民价值的特征的政治家）。我们表明，这两个渠道之间可能存在权衡。更高水平的有效问责制可能会阻碍选民了解政治家的能力。反过来，这可能会阻碍选举，损害选民福利。这是因为提高有效的问责制直接影响到治理结果对现任者类型的信息量。我们表明，如果政治家的努力和类型是当地的替代品（分别。在产生治理成果方面，有效问责的增加对应于有效问责的减少。Blackwell（1951）信息量。我们还表明，有效的问责制可以不同，即使没有制度的变化。特别是，我们提供了必要和充分的条件，有不同的有效问责和选举选择方面的多重均衡。总的来说，我们的研究结果对选民行为，制度改革的有效性和选民福利有影响。
Elections are thought to improve voter welfare through two channels: effective accountability (i.e., providing incentives for politicians to take costly effort) and electoral selection (i.e., retaining politicians with characteristics voters value). We show that there may be a trade-off between these two channels. Higher levels of effective accountability may hinder the voters' ability to learn about the politicians. In turn, this may hinder electoral selection and be detrimental to voter welfare. This is because increasing effective accountability directly impacts how informative governance outcomes are about an incumbent's type. We show that, if politicians' effort and type are local substitutes (resp. complements) in the production of governance outcomes, an increase in effective accountability corresponds to a decrease (resp. increase) in Blackwell (1951) informativeness. We also show that effective accountability can vary even absent institutional variation. In particular, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be multiple equilibria that differ in terms of both effective accountability and electoral selection. Overall, our findings have implications for voter behavior, the efficacy of institutional reforms, and voter welfare.
DOI：
10.2307/2149903
发表时间：
1981-01
期刊：
--
影响因子：
--
作者：
M. Fiorina
通讯作者：
M. Fiorina