Licensing Essential Patents: The Non‐Discriminatory Commitment and Hold‐Up
Licensing Essential Patents: The Non‐Discriminatory Commitment and Hold‐Up
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许可必要专利：非歧视性承诺和敲诈勒索
DOI：
10.1111/joie.12177
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jie Shuai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Youping Li;Jie Shuai
标准所必需的专利许可人通常需要按照合理和非歧视 (RAND) 条款进行许可。本文使用基本专利所有者和投资于符合标准的技术的被许可人的模型，证明非歧视性承诺缓解了敲诈勒索问题。此外，它还改善了消费者和社会福利，并随着许可收入的增加而促进上游创新。在每个许可人独立选择是否做出承诺的扩展模型中，所有许可人都在独特的均衡中自愿做出承诺。
Licensors of patents essential to a standard are often required to license on reasonable and non‐discriminatory (RAND) terms. Using a model with owners of essential patents and licensees who invest into standard‐conforming technologies, this paper demonstrates that the non‐discriminatory commitment alleviates the hold‐up problem. Moreover, it improves consumer and social welfare, and promotes upstream innovation as licensing revenue is increased. In an extended model with each licensor independently choosing whether to make the commitment, all licensors voluntarily commit in the unique equilibrium.
专利池的形成：时机很重要
影响因子：
2.8
作者：
Leveque;F.;Meniere;Y.
通讯作者：
Y.