Pareto-Optimality and Gains-from-Trade: A Comment
Pareto-Optimality and Gains-from-Trade: A Comment
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帕累托最优性和贸易收益：评论
DOI：
10.2307/2552642
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发表时间：
1972
期刊：
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
W. C. Stubblebine
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. M. Buchanan;W. C. Stubblebine
我们对 Shibata 的论文 [4]1 的反应有些矛盾。我们欢迎有机会澄清对帕累托机构的误解，这种误解显然比我们预期的更为普遍。另一方面，我们担心柴田反映这种误解的论点会产生更多的混乱。柴田对我们的分析提出了两点批评。首先，他对庇古税的处理提出了类似弗里德曼的方法论论证。我们担心的是，在征收庇古税之后以及在行动方（在我们的例子中为 B）的行为完全适应该税之后，私人可转让的贸易收益仍然存在。柴田接受了这一点，但他指出，我们未能考虑整个财政流程。税收将产生收入，在任何可概括的分析中都必须考虑到其处置。我们承认我们的论文中存在这种模糊性，并且我们欢迎柴田的提醒。然而，正如他自己对我们模型的阐述所揭示的那样，这种扩展无论如何都不会修改我们的中心命题，即：“……在消除所有边际外部性之前，通过单方面征收的税收和补贴永远不可能实现完全的帕累托均衡。”2柴田的例子表明，当庇古税的收益以任何一次性方式返还给封闭经济的成员时，外部性相互作用的各方继续面临着相互促进的前景。贸易收益。柴田的第二个更实质性的观点涉及帕累托最优的含义。正是在这里，他的讨论似乎可能（重新）带来严重的混乱。他所谓的“正确的数学公式”完全基于纯粹的技术生产前沿。然而，任何包含这种空洞（如果是传统的）概念的帕累托最优定义本身也同样是空洞的。社会产品转换函数只有在以下情况下才有意义：
Our reaction to Shibata's paper [4]1 is somewhat ambivalent. We welcome the opportunity to clarify a misunderstanding of the Paretian apparatus that is apparently more pervasive than we might have predicted. On the other hand, we fear that Shibata's argument reflecting this misunderstanding will generate still further confusion. Shibata offers a two-point criticism of our analysis. First, he advances a Friedman-like methodological argument to our treatment of the Pigovian tax. We were concerned with the demonstration that privately negotiable gains-from-trade remain after the Pigovian tax has been imposed and after the behaviour of the acting party (B in our example) has been fully adjusted to this tax. Shibata accepts this, but he notes that we failed to consider the entire fiscal process. The tax will yield revenues the disposition of which must be accounted for in any generalizable analysis. We acknowledge this obscurity in our paper, and we welcome Shibata's reminder. As his own elaborations on our model reveal, however, this extension does not, in any way, modify our central proposition to the effect that: ". .. full Pareto equilibrium can never be attained via the imposition of unilaterally imposed taxes and subsidies until all marginal externalities are eliminated".2 Shibata's examples indicate that when the proceeds of the Pigovian tax are returned to the members of the closed economy in any lump-sum manner, the parties to the externality interaction continue to be confronted with prospects for mutual gains-from-trade. Shibata's second, and more substantive, point involves the meaning of Pareto-optimality. It is here that his discussion seems likely to (re-) introduce substantial confusion. His so-called "correct mathematical formulation" is based wholly on a purely technological production frontier. Yet any definition of Pareto-optimality incorporating this empty, if traditional, notion must itself remain equally empty. Social product transformation functions have meaning only when