Memory-based prisoner's dilemma on square lattices
Memory-based prisoner's dilemma on square lattices
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DOI：
10.1016/j.physa.2010.02.008
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发表时间：
2010-06-15
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Wang, Long
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Liu, Yongkui;Li, Zhi;Wang, Long
我们研究了进化的囚徒困境与基于记忆的代理方格。通过将记忆效应引入到这个博弈中，我们假设个体的表现是根据他们记忆中的累积收益来评估的。它表明，如果个人表现为他们的成功的邻居，那么合作可以显着促进。详细讨论了负责促进合作的机制。我们证实，促进合作引起的记忆效应仍然是有效的，当采用一个优先选择规则或异步更新规则。我们的工作可能会为现实世界中的进化博弈研究提供一些新的思路，在现实世界中，个体记忆的影响在合作的进化中起着关键作用。(C)2010爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
We investigate the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma with memory-based agents on a square lattice. By introducing memory effects into this game, we assume that individuals' performance is evaluated in terms of the accumulative payoffs in their memories. It is shown that if individuals behave as their successful neighbors, then cooperation can be significantly promoted. The mechanism responsible for the promotion of cooperation is discussed in detail. We confirm that the promotion of cooperation induced by memory effects remains effective when a preferential selection rule or an asynchronous updating rule is employed. Our work may shed some new light on the study of evolutionary games in real-world situations where the effects of individuals' memories play a key role in the evolution of cooperation. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.