Coordination Mechanisms for Supply Chains Under Price and Service Competition
Coordination Mechanisms for Supply Chains Under Price and Service Competition
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DOI：
10.1287/msom.1070.0159
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发表时间：
2007-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Fernando Bernstein;A. Federgruen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Fernando Bernstein;A. Federgruen
在一个分散的供应链中，面对随机需求的独立零售商之间的长期竞争，从一个共同的供应商那里购买，应该如何确定批发和零售价格，以实现整个供应链利润的最大化？我们展示了什么类型的协调机制允许分散式供应链产生的总预期利润等于集中式系统中的最优利润，以及如何确定这些（完美的）协调方案的参数。我们假设零售商面临的随机需求函数，可能取决于所有的公司的价格以及他们的服务水平，例如，产品的稳态可用性。我们系统地比较了零售商仅在价格方面竞争时以及同时进行价格和服务竞争时的协调机制。
In a decentralized supply chain, with long-term competition between independent retailers facing random demands and buying from a common supplier, how should wholesale and retail prices be specified in an attempt to maximize supply-chain-wide profits? We show what types of coordination mechanisms allow the decentralized supply chain to generate aggregate expected profits equal to the optimal profits in a centralized system, and how the parameters of these (perfect) coordination schemes can be determined. We assume that the retailers face stochastic demand functions that may depend on all of the firms' prices as well as a measure of their service levels, e.g., the steady-state availability of the products. We systematically compare the coordination mechanisms when retailers compete only in terms of their prices, and when they engage in simultaneous price and service competition.