Two-levels of mental states attribution: from automaticity to voluntariness
Two-levels of mental states attribution: from automaticity to voluntariness
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DOI：
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.11.015
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发表时间：
2005-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Coricelli, G
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Coricelli, G
在本文中，我介绍了有两个层次的读心术的假设。第一个层次是指自动的前概念现象，它指定了对另一个人的思想的原始理解。它基于早期模仿、动作和情感识别。读心术的第二个层次是概念性的和自愿的。它是基于意向性、同理心和更深层次的推理。这两个层次的活动都是由内部模拟机制产生的。这一假设是基于人类和非人类神经科学证据。(C)2004爱思唯尔有限公司保留所有权利。
In this paper, I introduce the hypothesis that there are two levels of mindreading. The first level refers to automatic-preconceptual phenomena that specify a primitive understanding of another person's mind. It is based on early-imitation, action and emotion recognition. The second level of mindreading is conceptual and voluntary. It is based on intentionality, empathy, and higher depths of reasoning. The activities in both levels are generated by internal simulative mechanisms. This hypothesis is based on human and nonhuman neuroscientific evidence. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.