Computing undetectable attacks on power grids
Computing undetectable attacks on power grids
复制标题
计算对电网的不可检测的攻击
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Mauro Escobar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Bienstock;Mauro Escobar
我们考虑在最近的事件和研究的推动下，对电网进行数据和物理攻击的组合。我们考虑这样一种设置，其中攻击者可以通过移除线路来改变电网的拓扑结构，也可以改变某些节点的负载(需求)；同时，攻击者阻断流向控制中心的数据。我们使用PMU数据模型，提供高保真的交流潮流数据(电压和电流)攻击者的目标是提供数据，为电网描绘与净负荷变化一致的完全安全的图景，同时掩盖大的线路过载，这是一种可能导致连锁故障的根本危险情况。我们提供了一个计算过程，即使在大网格的情况下也能有效地计算稀疏攻击。
We consider combined data and physical attacks on power grids, motivated by recent events and research. We consider a setting where an attacker may alter the topology of a power grid by removing lines and may also alter the load (demand) of some nodes; simultaneously the attacker interdicts data flowing to the control center. We use the PMU model of data that provides high-fidelity AC power flow data (voltages and currents) The goal of the attacker is to provide data that paints a completely safe picture for the grid which is consistent with the net load change, while at the same time disguising large line overloads, a fundamentally dangerous situation that may lead to a cascading failure. We provide a computational procedure that efficiently computes sparse attacks even on cases of large grids.