Competitiveness of firm behavior and public policy for new technology adoption in an oligopoly
Competitiveness of firm behavior and public policy for new technology adoption in an oligopoly
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寡头垄断中企业行为和公共政策对新技术采用的竞争力
DOI：
10.1007/s10842-016-0231-2
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yasuhito Tanaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Masahiko Hattori;Yasuhito Tanaka
经济增长要求企业采用新技术。然而，从社会福利的角度来看，在竞争力较弱的行业，这可能是不足或过度的。在这种情况下，政府补贴或税收是必要的。我们分析了当企业绝对利润和相对利润的加权平均值达到最大时，企业采用新技术的最优补贴或税收政策。我们并不认为企业真的最大化了加权平均值，而是使用相对利润的权重作为企业行为竞争力的参数。我们表明，当采用新技术的设置成本较大（或较小）时，最优政策可能是补贴（或税收）。当竞争力较大（或较小），即接近完全竞争（或共同利润最大化）时，可能采取补贴（或税收）的方式。
Economic growth requires that firms adopt new technologies. However, it may be insufficient or excessive in less competitive industries from the social welfare point of view. In this case, a government subsidy or tax is necessary. We analyze the optimum subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption by firms when firms maximize the weighted average of absolute and relative profits. We do not consider that firms really maximize the weighted average, but the weight on the relative profit is used as a parameter indicating competitiveness of firm behavior. We show that the optimum policy is likely to be subsidization (or taxation) when the set-up cost for new technology adoption is large (or small). It is likely to be subsidization (or taxation) when competitiveness is large (or small), that is, it is near to perfect competition (or joint profit maximization).