Separating equilibria in continuous signalling games
Separating equilibria in continuous signalling games
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DOI：
10.1098/rstb.2002.1068
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发表时间：
2002-11-29
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
Lachmann, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bergstrom, CT;Számadó, S;Lachmann, M
大部分关于代价信号理论的文献都集中在分离连续信号博弈的均衡上。在这样的平衡下，每个信号发送者发送不同的信号，并且信号接收者能够从发送的信号准确地推断信号发送者的状况。在本文中，我们介绍了一种矢量场解的方法，简化了分离平衡点的求解过程。使用这种方法，我们表明，连续的信令游戏可以有低成本的分离均衡，尽管信号和接收器之间的利益冲突。我们发现，与先前的论点相反，诚实并不需要浪费的信号。最后，我们研究信号游戏中，不同的信号有不同的最小成本信号，并提供了一个数学理由的论点，即使是非信号性状将被夸大超出其表型最佳时，他们被其他人用来判断条件或质量。
Much of the literature on costly signalling theory concentrates on separating equilibria of continuous signalling games. At such equilibria, every signaller sends a distinct signal, and signal receivers are able to exactly infer the signaller's condition from the signal sent. In this paper, we introduce a vector-field solution method that simplifies the process of solving for separating equilibria. Using this approach, we show that continuous signalling games can have low-cost separating equilibria despite conflicting interests between signaller and receiver. We find that contrary to prior arguments, honesty does not require wasteful signals. Finally, we examine signalling games in which different signallers have different minimal-cost signals, and provide a mathematical justification for the argument that even non-signalling traits will be exaggerated beyond their phenotypic optimum when they are used by other individuals to judge condition or quality.