Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?
Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?
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DOI：
10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z
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发表时间：
2006-09-01
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Putterman, Louis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cinyabuguma, Matthias;Page, Talbot;Putterman, Louis
最近的实验表明，对搭便车者的自愿惩罚可以增加贡献，缓解搭便车问题。但惩罚者经常惩罚高贡献者，创造“不正当”激励，这可能会破坏自愿惩罚的好处。在我们的实验中，允许惩罚行为的惩罚减少了对高贡献者的惩罚，但会产生降低效率的二阶“不正当”惩罚。总的来说，效率和贡献略有提高，但并不显著。
Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating "perverse" incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment.In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order "perverse" punishment. On balance, efficiency and contributions are slightly but not significantly enhanced.