Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers
Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01438.x
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发表时间：
2012-04-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Cushman, Fiery
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Schwitzgebel, Eric;Cushman, Fiery
我们研究了呈现顺序对职业哲学家和两个比较组的道德判断的影响。在针对双重效应原则、行动-不作为区分原则和道德运气原则的假设道德情景的判断上，所有小组都显示出相似大小的顺序效应。哲学家对相关的一般道德原则的认可也受到先前提出的假设情景的顺序的实质性影响。因此，即使在熟悉的案例和原则类型下，哲学专业知识似乎也不会增强道德判断的稳定性，以对抗这种可能不需要的偏见来源。
We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar-sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action-omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the stability of moral judgments against this presumably unwanted source of bias, even given familiar types of cases and principles.